Canadian Journal of Family Law
Volume 28

Number 2

2014

Consent, Coercion, and Shared Parenting: Ruffudeen-Coutts v
Coutts
Susan B. Boyd

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan B. Boyd, "Consent, Coercion, and Shared Parenting: Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts" (2014) 28:2 Can J
Fam L 279.

The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca

CONSENT, COERCION and SHARED
PARENTING: RUFFUDEEN-COUTTS V
COUTTS
Susan B. Boyd*
Over the past couple of decades, social and legal norms have
shifted radically in favour of shared parenting as the preferred
model for post-separation parenting, whether that be shared
decision-making or shared time.1 Even in jurisdictions such as
Canada that have not legislated a preference for shared
parenting time, shared arrangements and joint custody awards
have steadily increased. 2 The notion that children may be
harmed if they do not maintain generous contact with their
fathers is firmly entrenched, despite ongoing critical analysis of
the consequences of excessive attention to the need for contact
relative to other considerations.3 Even in the face of a strong
*
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1

Helen Rhoades, “The Rise and Rise of Shared Parenting Laws: A
Critical Reflection” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 75.!

2

For example, Canadian statistics for 2003 indicate that in 44 percent
of court-determined custody cases in the divorce context, the outcome
is an order for joint custody, which is more than double the number
from the mid-1990s and four times the figure when compared to the
late 1980s: Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender Based
Statistical Report, 5th ed (Ottawa: Target Group Project, 2006) at
103-116. It is reasonable to assume that the percentage of joint
custody awards have risen since 2003.!

3

The focus tends to be on paternal contact because children still live
primarily with their mothers after separation or divorce. Because
Canada has conducted less empirical research on the outcomes of
custody arrangements, this comment draws mainly on empirical
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statement from the Ontario Court of Appeal that joint custody
orders should not be made in contested cases without “some
evidence before the court that, despite their differences, the
parents are able to communicate effectively with one another”,4
joint custody is sometimes ordered in fact scenarios that fly in
the face of this message.5 In some cases, this result occurred
because of the ideological convictions of a judge that joint
custody is superior to sole custody or due to a failure to take
seriously problematic conduct by one of the parents.6
Despite the apparent embrace of shared parenting
within the legal system, empirical research cautions against any
“one size fits all” approach to the wellbeing of children whose
parents live apart. For instance, Trinder’s review of empirical
studies on shared parenting time (which does not necessarily
mean equal time but rather can be as low as 30 percent of time
with one parent) shows that while shared residence can be a
positive outcome in a climate of parental cooperation and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
studies in other jurisdictions such as Australia and England. Critical
voices have, however, been raised in Canada against the normative
shift toward joint custody and shared parenting. See for example:
Susan B. Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and
Parenting Apart” (2010) 18:2 Fem Legal Stud 137; Elizabeth Hughes,
"The Language and Ideology of Shared Parenting in Family Law
Reform: A Critical Analysis" (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 1; Martha
Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment
to Divorce: What the Social Science Literature Does and Does Not
Tell Us” (2007) 26 Can Fam LQ 286 [Shaffer, “Joint Custody,
Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”].!
4

Kaplanis v Kaplanis (2005), 249 DLR (4th) 620, 194 OAC 106 (Ont
CA) at para 11.!

5

Martha Shaffer, "Joint Custody Since Kaplanis and Ladisa – A
Review of Recent Ontario Case Law" in Martha Shaffer, ed,
Contemporary Issues in Family Law (Toronto: Thomson Canada,
2007) 431 at 459-470 [Shaffer, “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”].!

6

Ibid.!
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where children’s needs are prioritized, in higher conflict cases,
which typically follow litigation, negative outcomes for
children are too often found.7 The research shows that children
can benefit from regular contact with both parents after
separation, but only when they cooperate, communicate, and
have low levels of conflict.8 Moreover, social science research
does not reveal a clear linear relationship between the amount
of parenting time and better outcomes for children.9
Given this research, it might be thought that an
approach that looks to the needs and interests of the individual
child at the heart of a dispute would be far preferable to a procontact or shared parenting approach. The former approach
would be far better suited to the task of preventing
unacceptable risk to children. Instead, shared parenting remains
rooted as the preferential norm, being the de facto, if not the de
jure, starting point for decision-making both inside and outside
the courts. Mothers who raise concerns about contact by the
other parent are too often vilified as selfishly promoting their

7

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Liz Trinder, “Shared Residence: A Review of Recent Research
Evidence” (2010) 22:4 Child & Fam LQ 475. See also Belinda
Fehlberg et al, “Legislating for Shared Time Parenting After
Separation: A Research Review” (2011) 25:3 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam
318; Helen Rhoades, “The Dangers of Shared Care Legislation: Why
Australia Needs (Yet More) Family Law Reform” (2008) 36:3
Federal L Rev 279; Belinda Fehlberg, Christine Millward, and
Monica Campo, “Shared Post-Separation Parenting in 2009: An
Empirical Snapshot” (2009) 23 Austl J Fam L 247; and Shaffer,
“Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”, supra
note 3.!
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See review of the literature in Fehlberg et al, supra note 7.!
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Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s
Adjustment”, supra note 3; Bruce Smyth, “A Five Year Retrospective
of Post-Separation Shared Care Research in Australia” (2009) 15:1 J
Fam Stud 36.!
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own interests or, worse, as engaging in conduct that alienates
the other parent.10
The 2012 decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts11 suggests that parents who attempt
to resist custody arrangements that embody the hegemony of
the pro-contact or pro-shared parenting approach can face an
uphill battle. It also illustrates the considerable influence that a
judge can have on negotiated consent orders between parents.
Parents who are concerned about how they or their children
will fare under a shared parenting regime may not be “heard”
within negotiations or court proceedings in the same way as
those who push for a shared parenting arrangement. Moreover,
they may be persuaded, or even coerced, to agree to
arrangements that may not be in their children’s best interests.
RUFFUDEEN-COUTTS V COUTTS
The technical issue in Ruffudeen-Coutts was whether leave to
appeal was required in the case, given that the order was
ostensibly a consent order (for joint custody and shared
primary residence) that normally requires leave to appeal.12
The father had brought a motion to quash the mother’s appeal
for lack of leave. The first appellate panel found that leave was
required because the order was a consent order and dismissed
the motion to quash because the proper leave materials had not
been prepared. A new panel of the Court of Appeal was then
asked to deal with both the leave issue and with the merits of
the appeal, should leave be granted. Epstein J.A., for the
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10

Helen Rhoades, “The ‘No Contact Mother’: Reconstructions of
Motherhood in the Era of the ‘New Father’” (2002) 16 Int’l JL Pol’y
& Fam 71.!

11

Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts, 2012 ONCA 65, 348 DLR (4th) 64
[Ruffudeen-Coutts].!

12

Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 133(a).!
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majority, found that the mother’s argument that she was under
duress at the time she entered the agreement that formed the
foundation of the order was not supported by any affidavit
evidence.13 Furthermore, the majority confirmed that the order
was a consent order14 despite the unusual circumstances, which
are explained below. As such, leave to appeal was required
before the merits could be considered.
Epstein J.A. noted that jurisprudence reveals resistance
to allowing a review of issues that the parties have represented
to the court as having been resolved.15 Where the issue relates
to the validity of consent, leave should not be granted unless
the evidence demonstrates that there is an arguable case that, at
the time the agreement that formed the basis of the consent
order was entered into, the moving party could not or did not
consent due to factors such as fraud, duress, or undue
influence. 16 It was, however, noted that matters involving
children fall into a special category, given the court’s
obligation to give priority to the child’s best interests.17 Before
articulating the test for cases involving children, Epstein J.A.
made three observations speaking to the desirability of
upholding consent orders and the high threshold for obtaining
leave even in cases involving children:
a. In cases involving children, the statutory requirements
related to best interests of the child mean that the
judge’s determination should attract deference.
b. Finality itself has been recognized as being in the best
interests of the child.
13
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Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 48.!

14

Ibid at paras 49-56.!

15

Ibid at para 59.!

16

Ibid at para 64.!

17

Ibid at paras 65-66.!
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c. Family law practice and procedure encourages parties
to come to an agreement on as many issues as possible,
and therefore, consent orders are regularly granted.
Allowing them to be easily appealed would provide
another route to prolonged litigation.18
As a result, Epstein J.A. found that “leave to appeal
consent orders in family law cases involving children should
not be granted unless . . . the record demonstrates an arguable
case that the order, at the time it was made, was not in the
child(ren)’s best interests.”19 Epstein J.A. could find nothing in
the record in the case at hand to support the conclusion that the
judge did not honour his statutory obligations to make a
determination in the child’s best interests. In fact, she said, “the
order in this case was for shared custody, which on its face, is
consistent with the maximum contact principle articulated in s.
16(10) of the Divorce Act.”20 Like too many judges, Epstein
J.A. overlooked the precise wording of section 16(10), which is
that “the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of
the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as
is consistent with the best interests of the child.”21 It is entirely
possible that shared custody was not consistent with this child’s
best interests, a point to which I return below.
Epstein J.A. went on to look at the law on consent in
contracts and to find that there was no evidence to support the
duress argument presented by Ms. Ruffudeen-Coutts. Ms.
Ruffudeen-Coutts had been represented by counsel and there
was no evidence that counsel gave ineffective advice or
assistance, nor evidence from counsel about how, if at all, his
18
19
20
21
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Ibid at paras 69-71.!
Ibid at para 73.!
Ibid at para 74.!
Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), s 16(10) [emphasis added].!
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client was affected by the conduct of the motion judge.22 A
strong dissent by Feldman J.A. disagreed on the approach to
the consent order and the merits.
THE FACTS
The facts in Ruffudeen-Coutts, as presented by Epstein J.A.,
reveal a short marriage of four years (2006-2010), with one
young child, a two-year-old son, and a history of conflict, at
least post-separation. The mother applied for divorce along
with, inter alia, sole custody and only supervised access by the
father. The father brought a counter-motion in which he sought
shared custody. Seven days after her application for divorce,
the mother brought a motion on an urgent basis for a temporary
order for sole custody and supervised access by the father,
exclusive possession of the home and a restraining order
against the father. After negotiations, a temporary agreement
was reached whereby the son would reside with the mother and
the father would have supervised access. A restraining order
was also agreed to. These terms were reflected in a consent
order dated the same day, December 22, 2010.
The dissenting justice, Feldman J.A., added more
factual texture. The supervised access that had been agreed to
was to be by either the father’s brother or the mother’s brother.
The consent order restrained direct communication between the
parties, and police assistance was ordered to enforce the order
and return the child to the mother after access visits.23 The
mother’s affidavit alleged she was the sole caregiver to her son,
having taken off 14 months from her job following his birth.
The mother also alleged that “the father showed little interest in
caring for the child, was abusive to her including yelling,
swearing and throwing things at her, and that she feared for her
22
23
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Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 76.!
Ibid at para 7.!
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safety and that of the child.” 24 The father denied these
allegations and claimed that the mother was keeping the child
from him. Clearly there was at least high conflict, and at worst
possible abuse, at issue in this case. The child had never spent a
night with the father alone.25
THE MOTION JUDGE
In March 2011, the father brought a motion on an urgent basis
for a change in access and return of his passport. The mother
brought a cross-motion for contempt, alleging that the father
was not cooperating with efforts to sell the home. Once again,
they negotiated a settlement, dealing with all issues other than
the father’s access, certain child care expenses and an expert
assessment requested by the father. These outstanding issues
came before Hambly J., the motion judge, on May 31, 2011. At
this hearing, both parents were represented by counsel.
According to Epstein J.A., the mother’s counsel at
some point asked for time to seek instructions from his client
with regard to a possible resolution, and after a short break, the
parties advised that they had reached an agreement. One key
term was that custody and support of the child would be shared
and there would be no spousal support. Minutes of Settlement
were signed and the motion judge indicated that he would grant
an order accordingly. However, on his own initiative, the
motion judge wrote reasons “in which he purported to explain
his willingness to endorse the consent.”26 As well, he suggested
that three terms be added, for example, providing for
prohibitions against the parties criticizing each other or
allowing others to criticize them in front of their son. The final
order dealt with all unresolved matters and added these three
24
25
26
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Ibid at para 8.!
Ibid at para 31.!
Ibid at para 43.!
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terms characterized by Epstein J.A. as “peripheral to the issues
of importance to the parties.”27
Referring in some detail to the transcript of the May
2011 hearing, Feldman J.A. noted that it disclosed “that the
motion judge made it clear from the beginning that having read
the record, he was upset with the way the mother had carried
on the litigation including her allegations against the father and
her emergency motion.”28 The motion judge observed that the
mother’s conduct in “exaggerating and making extreme
unsubstantiated allegations . . . constituted evidence of
attempting to alienate the father from his child.”29 Even though
neither party was asking at that time that the primary residence
of the child be moved from the mother on an interim basis, the
judge “suggested to the parties at the lunch break that they each
determine what conditions they would seek if the primary
residence of the child were changed to be with the father.”30
Over an extended lunch period, the parties and their counsel
negotiated. The mother’s counsel requested more time, saying
they had made some progress. The judge responded by
clarifying that he was the one to make the order, so any
resolution was to be only with his approval. When the parties
came back, they again needed more time, which was resisted
by the motion judge. He gave them only a “little time” and
cautioned that he would not approve a police assistance order,
“which he felt was inappropriate in a child custody context.”
Feldman J.A. stated that the motion judge “made it clear that he
believed parents should get along for the sake of the child.”31

27
28
29
30
31
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Ibid.!
Ibid at para 10.!
Ibid at para 17.!
Ibid at para 10.!
Ibid at para 14.!
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Feldman J.A. added more detail about the order of the motion
judge. It was for shared custody, with primary residence being
one week with the mother, then one week with the father, plus
12 hours access on the non-residential week. Counsel disagreed
on whether that was a “final” or a “trial” order, with the
mother’s counsel thinking he had agreed to an order that would
be tried out. “The judge said he thought the word written was
‘final’ and he made it final.”32 He concluded by commending
the parties for working it out “after listening to me.”33 His
reasons for judgment, released six days later, indicated that he
felt that the mother and her counsel had overreached in
bringing the original emergency motion and that there was no
evidence to support a supervised access order. The husband
had earlier consented to this order, approved by another motion
judge.
In addition, the motion judge struck an affidavit made
by the mother’s brother, in which he expressed negative views
about the father’s interactions with the child, from the record.
Finally, in paragraph 10 of the reasons of the motion judge, he
stated: “I told counsel . . . that the primary residence of the
child should be with the father and the issue was whether the
wife’s involvement with the child should be supervised in a
manner that would ensure that she did not attempt to alienate
the child from the father. I also emphasized that the child was
entitled to the involvement and support of both parents in his
life as he grew up. After receiving my view, counsel asked for
time to seek instructions from their clients, which I readily
gave them.”34
This more detailed account of what went on prior to
agreement being reached by the parents, presented by Feldman
32
33
34
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J.A., makes more sense of the mother’s key argument: that her
consent was given under duress due to the comments made by
the motion judge and, as such, did not amount to consent in
law. As we have seen, the majority of the Court of Appeal did
not accept this argument.
THE DISSENT
Feldman J.A., in dissent, did not deal with the duress issue
directly. Instead, she found that part of the order was made on
consent, while part was not. As such, she found that leave to
appeal was not required. If, however, she were wrong and the
order was indeed a consent order requiring leave to appeal,
then she “would grant leave on the basis that the motion judge
made an error of law by failing to fully consider the best
interests of the child, which is always required, including when
the order is on consent.”35 Feldman J.A. noted that the Court of
Appeal decision in Kaplanis v Kaplanis36 also involved facts
where the parties had trouble communicating. In Kaplanis,
Weiler J.A. found that where parties have trouble
communicating, there must be some evidence that they will be
able to effectively communicate before joint custody can be
ordered.37 Feldman J.A. found that the record in RuffudeenCoutts revealed a motion judge who was so focused on his
perception that the mother was trying to alienate the child that
he did not properly consider the best interests of the child, as
required by the relevant statutes. She stated that “the court’s
obligation to ensure that the agreement reached was in the best
interests of the child required at least testing the evidence and
possibly expert involvement before making a final order.”38
35

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ibid at para 23.!

36

Kaplanis v Kaplanis (2005), 249 DLR (4th) 620, 194 OAC 106 (Ont
CA).!

37

Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 29.!

38

Ibid at para 34.!
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She would have set aside the final order and ordered a new
hearing regarding interim custody arrangements.39
CONCLUSION
In the end, all justices offered a way for the mother to change
the ostensibly consensual order for shared time, especially
given the incomplete evidence in the case. Epstein J.A.
signaled that she found some comments from the motion judge
“troubling”,40 and noted that the mother was “not left without
an opportunity to address her concerns upon a proper record
and in the appropriate forum.” 41 The mother could bring a
motion to set aside the order on the ground of facts arising or
discovered after the order was made. Epstein J.A. also stated
that such a motion, if brought, should be heard by a judge other
than the motion judge.
The mother eventually found a remedy via this route.
She successfully applied for an order to set aside the four
paragraphs of the May 31, 2011 order that had required shared
custody on alternating weeks. Madam Justice Leitch found that
“it is very clear on the evidence that the comments of the
motions judge coerced the settlement” and that he recognized
that his expression of his views had a significant impact on the
parties.42 Although Leitch J. felt that the motions judge had
“offered his candid reflections to help the parties”, in the
circumstances of the case, “the motions judge did not present
as a neutral referee who only expressed preliminary
impressions, views or concerns and the resulting pressure
39
40
41
42
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Ibid at para 35.!
Ibid at para 76.!
Ibid at para 78.!
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placed on the Applicant was illegitimate and coerced her
will.”43 In place of the paragraphs that were set aside, Leitch J.
made a temporary order reflecting what the parties had outlined
in the original consent endorsement request placed before the
motions judge on May 31, 2011: primary residence with the
mother. She also ordered that a case conference be scheduled
on an urgent basis.44
Ruffudeen-Coutts raises an issue about the extent to
which judges should convey to high conflict parties before
them quite directive messages about the desired outcome of the
dispute. The motion judge in effect did this by suggesting that
an order changing primary residence to the father was likely
and by implying that “parents should get along for the sake of
the child.”45 At best, the motion judge was attempting to get the
parties to negotiate a settlement, as they had done previously;
at worst, he was trying to punish the mother by removing
primary residence from her. In the mother’s mind, this pressure
from the motion judge would likely have prompted her to
consider the “compromise” of shared parenting as the only way
for her to retain some custodial rights and protect her child’s
interests. The evidence before Leitch J. by the applicant and
her lawyer was precisely to that effect.46
It is impossible to know whether the motion judge was
attempting to prompt a resolution that reflected shared
parenting, but that was the outcome. Whether that outcome
reflected the child’s best interests is open to question. For one
thing, “[t]here is no empirical evidence showing a clear linear
relationship between shared time and improving children’s
43
44
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Ibid at para 101.!
Ibid at para 109.!

45

Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 14.!

46

Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 42 at paras 43-63.!
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outcomes.”47 While studies show that “it is good for children to
maintain continuing and regular contact with both parents
when they cooperate and communicate and have low levels of
conflict”,48 it is equally clear that these features are not typical
of the broader separating population and that they are not likely
to be present in high conflict separating couples such as the one
in Ruffudeen-Coutts. Moreover, there is “increasing evidence
that shared time arrangements present particular risks for
children when mothers express ongoing ‘safety concerns’,
where there is high ongoing parental conflict and when
children are very young—or some combination of these”,49 as
there was in Ruffudeen-Coutts. It is worth repeating that the
Divorce Act’s “maximum contact” principle in section 16(10)
applies only to the extent that contact is consistent with the best
interests of the child. 50 As well, in Ontario, as Shaffer has
emphasized, joint custody (and presumably shared time as
well) should not be considered or granted by a court when one
parent behaves in ways that are contrary to the child’s best
interests.51
The empirical studies reviewed by Fehlberg et al
indicate that “the evidence so far does not suggest that
changing the law to encourage shared time leads more families
to enter shared time arrangements, let alone ‘workable’
arrangements (ie manageable for parents and appropriate for
children’s needs at different points in their childhood).” 52
Although Fehlberg et al were mainly concerned with efforts to
47

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Fehlberg et al, supra note 7 at 321. See also Shaffer, “Joint Custody,
Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”, supra note 3.!

48

Ibid at 320.!

49

Ibid at 323.!

50

Divorce Act, supra note 21.!

51

Shaffer, “Joint Custody since Kaplanis”, supra note 5 at 464.!

52

Fehlberg et al, supra note 7 at 319.!
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legislate preferences for shared parenting, this cautionary note
should be considered by judges as well, given the power that
they can have over parties and their negotiated settlements.
Even if the evidence were not clear in Ruffudeen-Coutts that
duress had influenced the negotiation of the consent order, it
seems fairly evident that influence was brought to bear on the
negotiations and that the resulting order may not have placed
the best interests of the child first.
The desirability of encouraging consent orders and
finality of proceedings must surely be secondary to the need to
ensure that children’s needs and interests are protected. The
reasons why some parents find it difficult to come to settlement
are complex and researchers in England have concluded as
follows:
Acknowledging and dealing with the ethical and
emotional conflicts between parents, rather than
insisting that they are ignored for the sake of the
children, might actually produce a system that
will be more attentive to the long-term welfare
of children.53
These words of caution should be borne in mind in
light of the recent report presented to the Supreme Court of
Canada, urging that judges (as well as lawyers and law schools)
should embrace a culture of mediation and settlement that
would encourage litigants toward an early negotiated
settlement.54 While no-one would wish to see parents litigate
issues that need not be adjudicated, it would also be
53

54
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Carol Smart & Vanessa May, “Why Can’t They Agree? The
Underlying Complexity of Contact and Residence Disputes” (2004)
26:4 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 347 at 358.!
Kirk Makin, “Report to Supreme Court chief justice calls for family
law overhaul”, The Globe and Mail, March 27, 2013, online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>!
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problematic to see judges err on the other end of the
continuum, creating a climate of fear or coercion surrounding
dispute resolution, as appears to have been the case in
Ruffudeen-Coutts.

